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a dereliction legally defined and declared sufficient and never on the
admissions or consent of the parties." (Bishop, Marr., Div. &
Separ., Vol. 1, p. 1265). In the absence of proof of the plaintiff's
allegations, the Court is forbidden to grant the separation.' Yet
"the parties may make an agreement, which will become an order of
the Court, to do without sentence the thing prayed, or enter into
any other reasonable form of separation and the Court will specific-
ally enforce it." This is precisely the nature of separation agree-
ments, and, strange as it may seem, they will be upheld on the
ground of public policy above alluded to, or will be set aside under
the tests set out in the cases cited.
BOOK REVIEWS
"A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAIVER," by Renzo D. Bowers
(The V. H. Courtright Publishing Co.)
This work does not, like so many others, thresh old straw.
While the law of waiver has served as the subject of some admir-
able essays (see 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (Ist Ed.), 524,
title "Waiver"; 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.), 1089,
title, Id.), this is the first book, we believe, which is devoted ex-
clusively to that topic. Hence, it is somewhat of a pioneer, and, as
such, naturally excites the keenest interest. As a treatise, however,
it must be confessed that the book is a disappointment.
Whether wisely or not, it has become customary for reviewers
to refrain from commenting upon the style displayed in a treatise.
But, at the risk of being accused of pedantry, we cannot forbear
alluding to the carelessness in composition, which is evidenced in
this work. The perspicuity of almost every page in the book might
be improved, by the judicious elimination of pleonasms. Fre-
quently, the sentences in the work rival in length, but not in bril-
liancy of construction, those of Burke, as the following one (Sec.
196) well indicates: "Privileged communications between a patient
and his physician may be waived by the patient, or by his attorney.
personal representative, though not by an executor in an action to
revoke a will, heir at law, this however, being denied under a stat-
ute prohibiting a physician from testifying Ykithout the consent of
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his patient, assignee of an insurance policy beneficiary, guardian.
of a minor, parents of a child treated b$ the physician; but not,
however, by the husband of the patient, and it is even held that only
the patient can waive the privilege."
Even more serious, perhaps, than the long anl redundant sen-
tences, which are so constantly indulged in, is the yiolation of the
King's English (see e.g., p. 21; where "either" is used instead of
"any"; and p. 23, where a sentence in Sec. 8 seems meaningless,
and p. 219, where two sentences in Sec. 220 are printed as one).
A distinguished jurist wisely has observed that "definitions are
dangerous" (Andrews Bros. Co. v,. Youngston Coke Co., 86 Fed.
Rep. 585, 588 per Lupton, J.). The truth of his observation is
sustained by this work. In it (Sec. 1), "waiver" is defined as "the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be sur-
rendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit." Not-
withstanding its length, this definition is too narrow; it ignores the
qualification that an agreement- to waive a right is void, if it is con-
trary to public policy (see e. g., Mabee v. Crozier, 22 Hun. 264,
where an agreement to waive usury, and not to set it up as a de-
fense, was held void).
Again, the author falls into a curious error, by asserting (Sec.
2) that a waiver "may be shown . . .. by the doing or forbearing
(sicl) to do something inconsistent with the existence of a right
or an intention to rely upon it." It is not a little surprising, at this
late day, to note a writer apparently doubting (Sec. 4) that consid-
ation is a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the request of the
promisor. In dealing with waivers contained in bills and notes
(Secs. 74, 75), the author ignores the section in the uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law (Sec. 81 of the New York act relating there-
to). Indeedi a careful examination of the chapter on commercial
paper (p. 79, et seq.,) fails to disclose a single reference to the uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law, although, curiously enough, the
works of Ryles and Chitty are referred to.
On page 342, the author states (Sec. 343), without qualification,
that "a party cannot waive a tort and bring an action in assumpsit
against the tort feasor, except where the property has been con-
verted into money or its equivalent." At page 348. however, this
is shown not to be the universal rule.
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